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**JUST WAR THEORY AND
THE ETHICS OF INTERVENTION**

BY

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JUST WAR THEORY AND THE ETHICS OF INTERVENTION

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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines just war theory and its application to military interventions in civil conflicts. Discussion builds upon historical perspectives of just war theory as developed from classical times through the present day. Inclusive in this discussion is the development of the principle of non-intervention as embodied in twentieth century treaties and international law. Additionally, this paper explores new notions of "universal sovereignty" as distinguished from the nation-state concept of sovereign rights. Implicit in this discussion is an examination of an emerging set of universal values upon which military interventions of the future may be considered. The paper closes ethical and practical considerations as well as recommendations for successful interventions now and into the next century.

Just War Theory and the Ethics of Intervention

Outside the church, two dozen bodies rotted in the sun, the faces frozen in agony. Inside, light filtered dimly through shattered stained-glass windows. Heaps of corpses lay sprawled on straw mats or under blankets. Dozens lay around the altar; one woman cradled an infant. Shell casings littered the floor, mixed with Rwandan government photo-identity cards, bicycles, cooking pots, plastic water jugs and bits of clothing. An additional 20 or 30 bodies were crammed inside a small church library. Grenade fragments pocked the ceiling and walls; broken, framed portraits of Pope John Paul II looked down upon the carnage. On a chair, the skeletons of a man and a woman were locked in a final embrace.¹

The scene described above recounts just one of many horrific events surrounding the civil war in Rwanda. On a smaller scale, this could be a scene out of war torn Bosnia or famine stricken Somalia. As Americans, we are appalled by the senseless brutality of such events. We ask "Why can't somebody do something to stop the killing? Shouldn't somebody intervene to bring peace and stability to the situation?" To many Americans, the international community has a moral obligation to intervene in the civil wars of sovereign states when the toll of human death and suffering is so high.

This paper examines ethical and practical considerations under which the international community may intervene militarily in the internal conflicts and civil wars of sovereign states. This discussion builds upon the historical perspective of Just War theory as developed from classical times through the present day. Inclusive in this discussion is the development of the principle of non-intervention as embodied in twentieth century treaties and international law. These laws and treaties provide sovereign nation-states guarantees of independence and self-determination. Special

circumstances exist, however, under the rule of law and moral principle justifying military interventions on behalf of beleaguered states. This paper will also address the principle of sovereignty; without which a nation-state continues to function. Can the notion of sovereignty continue to be viable in the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous world of today? Is international law still relevant? Should the international community seek legalities to justify military intervention in support of national and regional interests or pursue altruistic interventions in support of what is morally expected? I will attempt to answer these questions with recommendations of what is perhaps both legally sufficient and morally acceptable grounds for intervention.

Classical Origins

Ancient Greek philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, authored the earliest accounts of just war theory. Prior to the development of this ethic for war, warfare was the domain of kings and pharoes. The ends always justified the means; the ends being the attainment of territory, riches, and power. No ethic dictated how such ends would be achieved. To escape bondage and remain free, the Israelites turned to Holy War to cleanse the land of all those not chosen by God's as His holy people. In Deuteronomy 20, the Jews established a code of holy war as it applied to enemy cities existing beyond the borders of Israel. When refusing to submit to Israeli domination, "only the males were ... put to the sword. Women, children, cattle, and goods were not subject to the ban, but might be enjoyed as spoils."² With the exception of trees bearing fruit, enemy cities existing within the borders of Israel were to be destroyed.³ Today, we would call this kind of warfare genocide.

Plato "first gave formulation" to a Just War code in application to the Hellenic conflicts of the Peloponnesian Wars.⁴ Plato believed that the object of war was "the restoration of peace".⁵ Though he did not distinguish combatant from noncombatant, Plato warned against "indiscriminate violence in which all alike would suffer."⁶

Aristotle was the first to coin the expression 'Just War' "to a war whose object was to enslave those designed by nature for servitude but who resisted their proper assignment in the social scale".⁷ He believed that wars should only be fought for the preservation of boundaries and the protection of crops.⁸

During the age of the Roman empire, "Cicero was to transform the just war into a code for conquerors - an ethic for empire".⁹ According to Cicero, only the state could conduct just wars. To fight in a just war, one had to be a citizen of the state. All wars were preceded by a "declaration of hostilities". Once defeated, all enemies of the state became subjects of Rome with the same privileges enjoyed by Roman citizens.¹⁰

Medieval Formations

Early Christian attitudes rejected war and military service up until the time of Constantine.¹¹ The rise of Constantine terminated pacifism as the central or majority view of the church. "A Christian ethic of war appears to have been formulated by St. Ambrose and then more fully by St. Augustine."¹² As the Roman empire encountered greater Barbarian threats from the Germanic states, Ambrose felt Christian participation in war was necessary to not only defend the empire but also the faith.¹³ Ambrose claimed that in order for wars to be fought , the "conduct of war should be

just and monks and priests should abstain".¹⁴

Later, St. Augustine elaborated further on the views of Ambrose. His writings in the fifth century supported a "partnership of church and empire"¹⁵ in order to preserve the survival of Christianity. For Augustine, the survival of Christianity correlated closely with the survival of the Roman Empire. Augustine came to a "kind of Christian realism in accepting the occasional inevitability of recourse to armed conflict"¹⁶ as brought on by the Barbarian threat to Rome. Augustine, more than anyone who preceded him, gave Christian acceptance to the participation in Armed Conflict.

In Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas further advanced Just War theory as conceptualized by Augustine and provided three conditions for its acceptance: First, in order for war to be just, it must be waged by competent authority, such as the head of state. Second, a just cause must preexist the onset of war. Finally, those who wage war must do so for some good intent or purpose.¹⁷

At this point, it is important to note that early Christian thought, from Ambrose to Aquinas, was to justify war in order to secure a better, longer lasting peace; a peace which would allow the survival of Christianity.

New World Precedents

The discovery of the New World and the emergence of the Renaissance offered opportunities for colonization and the flourishing of new ideas and culture. The impact of new world discoveries "gave impetus for international law to come about as a significant discipline for the next few centuries".¹⁸ Institutional survival no longer satisfied the requirement for Christian participation in war. The proliferation of

Christianity and the spread of European culture amongst the inhabitants of the western hemisphere occasionally led to armed conflict. From these conflicts grew new concepts of Just War theory. Two leading jurists or legal scholars of Just War theory during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius.

Vitoria presented his position on the law of war as it applied to the protection of Indians in South America. His view is similar to Augustine's in that "Christians are allowed to bear arms, to make war, and to resist aggression, by virtue of the law of nature; and that the just end and aim of war may be only the peace and security of the state".¹⁹ He further states that the only just cause of war is to redress the serious injury caused by another.²⁰ Vitoria emphasized the importance of taking only that action necessary to right a wrong in order to bring about lasting peace and security.²¹

Jurists of the seventeenth century increasingly became concerned with the regulation of armed conflict. This was due in large part to the rapid expansion of colonization in the western hemisphere.²² One such seventeenth century scholar struggling with the question of Just War theory was Hugo Grotius. Often cited as the father of modern international law, his "treatise *On the Law of War and Peace* contained a vision of an impartial international legal system structured with states as the players."²³ Grotius states that under certain circumstances, it is permissible to wage war particularly when it involves self preservation. According to Grotius, "the only reason for going to war is to redress a wrong".²⁴ He correlates the individual right of self preservation with the societal right of self-defense, especially as it applies to the

defense of one's property. He thus contends that "a defensive war may be undertaken either when the state's existence is endangered or when its territory is threatened...".²⁵ Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, legal scholars begin to apply more importance on the rights of states in determining when it is proper to intervene than in any period previously. We will see in the following centuries how such theorists give more weight to policies of nonintervention than they do to just war theory.

Supporting Nonintervention

By the late nineteenth century, an overwhelming number of jurists considered consequences of war to be so severe that its justification was rapidly becoming obsolete. Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, nations waged war on a magnitude never before seen in human history with a concomitant toll of human life. Collectively, lawyers and scholars of this time "regarded intervention as either completely forbidden or as a mode of international conduct which should be adopted rarely and for only the most compelling reasons".²⁶ Nonintervention became the norm as a "common principle of international behavior".²⁷ This norm is generally regarded as the result of a sovereign state's recognized right to conduct its own affairs without interference.²⁸

Several nineteenth century jurists supported rules of nonintervention. Rottech argued that "nations have complete independence and absolute sovereignty...(to the point where) intervention is 'absolutely' unacceptable".²⁹ He supports this position with the logic that previous interventions have been exceptionally destructive, especially

"for those states in which intervention was undertaken"³⁰

Montague Bernard supports nonintervention because of its importance to the "mutual respect and peaceable intercommunion" of sovereign states in the international community.³¹ Other theorists such as Andres Bello, Henry Weaton, and Herman Strauch all condemn intervention as a threat to a sovereign states "right of independence, which flows...from a state's right to territorial integrity and jurisdictional sovereignty".³² Jurists writing in the early twentieth century continued to support nonintervention as the "basic principle of international law...".³³

International Law

As noted earlier, Hugo Grotius fathered the concept of international law that provided "consistent rules" and "moral parameters for the conduct of war."³⁴ In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia "marked the beginning of the modern, state-centered concept of world order."³⁵ Independence, self-determination, and territorial control defined the conduct and relationship of one nation-state with another. International law provided a legal, and sometimes moral, framework by which nation-states could protect their sovereign right to exist. Until the twentieth century, however, nation-states considered war as merely an act of national policy; a tool to be wielded in the pursuit of national goals and objectives, not something to be condemned by the international community.

With the dawn of the French Revolution, war no longer loomed as the exclusive domain of kings and noble men. Citizens, and lots of them, took up arms for causes and dreams. Technology matched the growth in nationalism stride for stride. The mixture of both put war on a level of blood and gore unsurpassed in human history.

Not until the bloody aftermath of World War I, the "war to end all wars", would laws, treaties, and international fora surface to restrict the cruel realities of war. Following this war, the League of Nations attempted to restrict armed aggression through arbitration.³⁶ In 1928, the Briand-Kellogg Treaty, also known as the Pact of Paris, "sought to eliminate recourse to war as a means of settling international disputes."³⁷ This pact condemned the first resort to armed aggression but allowed nation-states the right to respond in defense of such aggression.³⁸ All efforts at restricting acts of aggression between nation states, however, failed to stop the slaughter of World War II. The war crimes tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo extended "the concept of 'crime against humanity' to initiating aggressive war."³⁹ At Nuremberg, the chief British prosecutor added to "the language of international law when he said, 'the killing of combatants is justifiable...only where the war itself is legal. But where the war is illegal...there is nothing to justify the killing and these murders are not to be distinguished from those of any other lawless robber bands.' "⁴⁰

In his book Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer formulates a theory of aggression which supports international law as defined by the United Nations Charter.

1. There exists an international society of independent states.
2. This international society has a law that establishes the rights of its members - above all, the rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty.
3. Any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act.
4. Aggression justifies two kinds of violent response: a war of self-defense by

the victim and a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other member of international society.

5. Nothing but aggression can justify war.

6. Once the aggressor state has been militarily repulsed, it can also be punished.⁴¹

Articles 2 and 51 of the United Nations Charter further "clarified the concepts of aggression and defense."⁴² "Article 2 prohibited member nations 'from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state' and empowered the Security Council to preserve peace; Article 51 granted to all nations, acting individually or collectively, the right to resist with force an 'armed attack' until the Security Council 'takes the necessary measures to restore international peace and security.' "⁴³

United Nations Charter

As we have seen in the preceding paragraphs, the principle of nonintervention supports "two...fundamental principles of international law... the principles of equality of states and self-determination of peoples".⁴⁴ United Nations Resolution 2131 of 1965 codifies the principles of nonintervention into a single comprehensive statement.

No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements are condemned....⁴⁵

These principles state, in effect, "that the values of equality of sovereign states and of self determination of peoples are very high values, overriding other values that might motivate intervention, such as concern for justice generally or for human rights".⁴⁶

Justified Exceptions

Given the principles of international law stated above, under what conditions is it "just" to intervene in the civil conflicts or wars of sovereign nations? In contemporary foreign policy, there are four prevailing conditions that often serve as exceptions to the principle of nonintervention: (1) Intervention by invitation, (2) intervention to protect nationals, (3) humanitarian intervention, and (4) intervention by treaty.⁴⁷

(1) Intervention by invitation. The international legal system generally regards the regimes of sovereign states as legitimate representatives of the state with the right to oversee or govern its internal affairs. If so, "an argument can be made for the right of a government to invite intervention."⁴⁸ Indeed, in a period of insurrection or internal political upheaval, the recent trend has been for sovereign states to seek the help of the international community with its own internal conflicts. Such was the case with U.S. intervention in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.⁴⁹

(2) Intervention to protect nationals. Occasionally, international law has sanctioned the right of one state to intervene in the affairs of another in order to protect its citizens stationed there. Justification for intervention was that the indigenous government did little to protect the lives of its foreign visitors, especially during periods of unrest or civil war.⁵⁰ A recent example of U.S. intervention under this exception was the U.S. rescue, by military means, of U.S. medical students studying in Grenada in 1983.

(3) Humanitarian intervention. This exception to the principle of nonintervention occurs when there is a need to "protect people from their own government".⁵¹ Clearly,

there was a need for such action to counter the "genocidal treatment of Jews by the Nazis"⁵² in World War II. The same can be said of more recent examples of genocide or "ethnic cleansing" in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. Recently, the United States intervened to assist with relief operations in Rwanda and, to some degree, in Somalia.

(4) Intervention by treaty. Occasionally, governments of small sovereign states align themselves with other states to guarantee security from a larger outside threat. During the Cold War years, European nations entered in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a means to counter a growing security threat from the Soviet Union. Likewise, the Warsaw Pact was an alignment of nations for security and the promotion of Communism. The Soviet Union used the cloak of this treaty to intervene in the affairs of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.⁵³

The Post Cold War Nation-State

The fabric of nation-statehood is sovereignty; the right to independence and self-determination. Without it, the nation-state ceases to exist. Contemporary international law recognizes sovereign states within the territorial context of geographical boundaries. To intervene in the internal affairs of another state is to infringe on that state's ability to legally exercise its sovereign rights. Events in the world today, however, suggest that the traditional nation-state and, consequently, the concept of sovereignty, may be crumbling along cultural, ethnic, religious, and ideological lines. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of Communism, the world watched helplessly as country after country crumbled under the strain of ethnic and religious strife. In Rwanda, half a million Tutsis perished after

genocidal attacks by Hutu tribesmen. "Ethnic cleansing" was the order of the day in Bosnia-Hertzegovina where warring Christian factions of Bosnian Serbs committed unthinkable atrocities on Bosnian Muslims. Today, citizens of nation-states frequently question the legal right of their governments to exercise its sovereignty in a just and equitable manner. To exercise sovereignty, governments of nation-states must be seen as legitimate by its citizens. The international community must doubt the sovereign right of a nation-state to exist when it "turns savagely upon its own people."⁵⁴ "When a people are being massacred, [the international community does not] require that they pass the self-help test before coming to its aid."⁵⁵ Governments of nation-states "who initiate massacres lose their right to participate in the normal...processes of self determination" or sovereignty.⁵⁶ Such governments "are readily identified as criminal governments...[as defined] under the Nuremberg code of 'crimes against humanity'"⁵⁷ and are therefore subject to humanitarian intervention on moral, if not legal, grounds.

Universal Values

In his article "Empowering the United Nations", the Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Gali, states that there exists a "universal sovereignty that resides in all humanity and provides all peoples with legitimate involvement in issues affecting the world as a whole."⁵⁸ Part and partial to the concept of "universal sovereignty" is the notion of universal values; values shared and understood by the majority of societies in the world. Such values are "increasingly find[ing] expression in the gradual expansion of international law."⁵⁹ In 1948, the General Assembly of the

United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this document, member states pledged to promote "universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms..."⁶⁰ Many countries adopted provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in their national constitutions and international agreements. The Universal Declaration "was viewed as the first step in the formulation of an 'international bill of human rights' that would have legal as well as moral force."⁶¹ Adopted by the United Nations in 1976, The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the aforementioned Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as three other covenants: The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These "covenants require countries ratifying them to recognize or protect a wide range of human rights."⁶² Formal procedures now exist for individual and member states to present alleged violations to the United Nations Human Rights Committee.⁶³

Future interventions based on "the new politics of humanitarianism"⁶⁴ may become "the morally right thing to do...though it registers none of the standard benefits...of national self interest."⁶⁵ As the world shrinks, nations become intertwined in the activities of all. To survive globally, nations must come to recognize a shared set of values. "Without a common set of values, communities are no more than unstable collections of individuals coexisting uneasily within common boundaries."⁶⁶

As we enter a new millennium, the future prospect of a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world "impels a heightened search for points of moral stability

as platforms for problem solving.⁶⁷ In his book Shared Values for a Troubled World, Rushworth M. Kidder recognized the need for the world community to build consensus on a common set of shared values:

...real problem solving always comes with a prerequisite: a common framework of values, explicit or unarticulated, in which all parties to the solution feel some ownership. Global problem solving, in particular, requires a shared set of values, common not only across the different disciplines and skills needed around the table but across the different cultures, races, and traditions involved in the solution. Only if global problem solving arises from a consensus on a case of values will its premises be acceptable and its conclusions doable.⁶⁸

The challenges facing the United Nations today is one of consensus building; consensus on what constitutes a universally acceptable set of values. Such values as world order and human rights may constitute the *raison d'être* for interventions of the future. Old notions of state sovereignty succumb to the protection of shared values in a universal sovereignty.

Dangers do exist, however, in values-based interventions. First, values-based interventions must not compete for scarce military (i.e. personnel and materiel) resources; resources dedicated to the preservation of national self interests. There must be an equitable distribution of resources such that all nations have it within their common interest to intervene on behalf of a shared set of values. Collective action must be perceived as within the important, if not vital, interests of all.

Second, the United Nations must develop a strategy whereby values-based interventions will result in lasting and constructive change. This strategy must include a coalition of forces with the appropriate command structure to affect change within a relatively short period of time. Upon the restoration of peace and the imposition of an

acceptable set of "universal values", the United Nations should provide a force to monitor the maturation of the political process until such a peace is firmly entrenched.

Finally, the United Nations cannot focus on "universal values" at the expense of the larger global picture. Nation-states still exist. The preservation of national sovereignty remains the focus of nonintervention policy. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter dictates when it is appropriate to intervene in the affairs of another state. Any action contemplated, be it values-based interventions or otherwise, must meet the criteria established by the UN Charter and be governed by the precepts of existing international law. Just war criteria still applies.

Contemporary Just War Thinking

Today, international law and the writings of contemporary just war theorists provide some guidelines for justified military interventions. Such Christian just war theorists as Roland Bainton and Paul Ramsey support intervention on the moral grounds of self defense. According to Paul Ramsey, Christians have a moral obligation to resort to a limited use of force when ones neighbor is "being unjustly attacked". The exercise of such force is with restraint and should not be brought to bear on innocent bystanders.⁶⁹

In 1983, the American Catholic Bishops in their pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace spoke out against the use of nuclear weapons as a justified instrument of war. They accepted with reluctance, however, the deterrent effect such weapons possessed until more acceptable means could be found.⁷⁰

In November 1984, former Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger "delivered

a historic speech which advanced U.S. strategic thought regarding the use of force by a democratic state.⁷¹ Weinberger stated that democratic states must meet the criterion of six tests before committing military forces in pursuit of political or humanitarian objectives.

1. The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
2. If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so whole heartedly, and with the clear intention of winning.
3. If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives.
4. The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed--their size, composition and disposition--must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
5. Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives of congress.
6. The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.⁷²

Ethical Considerations

The fall of the Soviet Union and the demise of Communism found the international community facing a more volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous world. As mentioned previously, unstable governments and shifting alliances are the norm for the day. We are witness to untold tragedies unsurpassed by any known in recent history. The continuing conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda beg for international action. We finally come to the point in our discussion where one asks "When is enough, enough?!" Given the above historical perspectives on Just War

theory and prevailing international policy regarding nonintervention, with notable exceptions, there are ethical considerations worth mentioning prior to any conceived intervention.

First, there must be a just cause for intervention. Such cause must be established by competent, legitimate authority. Such authority must establish proper intent such as the intervention to relieve the human suffering brought on by acts of civil war or to protect lives of citizens living abroad.

Second, military intervention should seek to follow the rules of Just Conduct as can be found in the international laws of war (i.e. Geneva Convention regarding treatment of noncombatants and prisoners of war). Combat, once initiated, should strive to be both proportional and discriminatory. Proportionality weighs the cost of means against the anticipated end. Actions taken should seek to preclude noncombatant battle casualties.

Third, contemplated intervention should occur only after exhausting all other means through economic, political, and/or diplomatic channels. One should not construe this to mean that military intervention should follow only after pursuing all the means listed above. On the contrary; occasions may arise where recourse to military action is the only viable means to resolving a crisis. One gives due consideration first to the means available at the diplomatic, political, and economic level; if deemed unwise, then consider the military option.

Fourth, as the international community becomes ever more entrenched in the web of transnational activities, regional and multilateral security frameworks are

replacing the paradigm of nation-state sovereignty. The United Nations must assume the mantle of leadership in helping to form consensus on a set of values universally accepted by its member states. Such values will provide additional justification for the military interventions of tomorrow. Hand-in-hand with the creation of these values is the building of consensus among nation-states. Where threats to common values-based interests exist, consensus among nations must exist to build effective coalitions. Only through the collective efforts of many nations may the threats of tomorrow be deterred.

Finally, no military action should be considered without a reasonable chance for success. Such success should include as its ultimate objective the restoration of peace, the promotion of stability, and the guarantee of justice.

Recommendations

If history is replete with examples of military folly, then let us learn by it. We are familiar with past examples of military intervention gone amuck. One has to go no further than our own recent past and the military interventionist policies that led to our failures in Vietnam. Perhaps the same can be said of our misadventures in Somalia. Therefore, given Just War historical perspective and ethical considerations, here are some practical recommendations one must consider before embarking on a policy of intervention.

First, whether acting as part of the international community or unilaterally, there must be a threat to our vital national interests. These interests are defined in National Strategic Policy with focus provided by our National Military Strategy. Again, all other

means short of war should eclipse any contemplated military intervention (i.e. economic sanctions, political and diplomatic negotiations).

Second, recent events on the world stage involving massive human suffering bring overwhelming concern on the part of the international community. With mass human suffering comes mass migration. Major population shifts only increase the stress on the global environmental scene. The international community has an obligation to act in order to bring about regional stability and promote the peace.

Third, any strategy of intervention must include a defined end state. This includes an articulation of the rules of engagement as well as a plan for disengagement. One needs to describe the conditions that define success or victory.

Fourth, no intervention should be pursued without full public support. We have witnessed the moral decay of a nation resulting from the lack of public support for our policy in Vietnam. In many ways, nations champion public support by providing the ingredients of intervention listed above. It is the responsibility of those who govern and those who lead to educate the public through whatever media on policies impacting on the lives of our citizens.

Finally, no intervention is possible without the resources to man, equip, train, and sustain a modern fighting force. In today's world of growing entitlement, mounting deficits, and declining dollars, the ability to resource a force of sufficient means to carry out a defined end becomes increasingly difficult.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Just War theory provides a formula for ethical considerations

involving military intervention today. As developed by theologians and jurists of the past, a policy of preferred nonintervention governs our international perspective. However, in response to a more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world, the international community finds itself increasingly more involved in the affairs of sovereign states. We can no longer afford to ignore the misdeeds of others. The impact of doing so indirectly effects the way we live in the long term. Failure to resolve internal conflict that threatens the regional stability of the world may only be solved, in the end, by the strength of military action. If that is the case, we have a moral obligation to act responsibly and ethically in accordance with the values laid down by international law. We can afford to do nothing less.

Endnotes

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